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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
We have before us John Minarik's second petition for 
relief under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. It was tendered to the 
District Court after the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and 
transferred to this Court pursuant to the provisions of that 
act. Minarik's first S 2254 petition wasfiled prior to 
AEDPA's passage. We must decide whether the gatekeeping 
provisions made applicable to "second or successive 
petitions" by 28 U.S.C. S 2244 as amended by AEDPA 
should be applied in Minarik's case. We conclude that such 
application would have no impermissible retroactive effect 
and, accordingly, that AEDPA's modified version ofS 2244 
requires us to deny him permission to proceed with his 
successive petition. 
 
I. 
 
On February 7, 1971, Minarik killed his former fiancee 
with an ax. In October 1971, Minarik pleaded guilty to the 
murder. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas 
convicted Minarik of first degree murder and sentenced him 
to life imprisonment. Minarik did not pursue a direct 
appeal. In 1977, Minarik filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. The Court of Common Pleas granted the 
motion. That decision, however, was ultimately overturned 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and Minarik was not 
permitted to withdraw his plea. Commonwealth v. Minarik, 
427 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1981). 
 
In 1981, Minarik filed his first federal habeas corpus 
petition alleging two grounds for relief. First, Minarik 
claimed that he had not knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entered his guilty plea because (1) th e trial 
court failed to explain the requisite mental state required 
for first degree murder, and (2) he had no memor y of the 
events surrounding the murder. Second, Minarik claimed 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reversal of the 
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Court of Common Pleas' decision allowing Minarik to 
withdraw his guilty plea violated his due process and equal 
protection rights. An extensive evidentiary hearing was held 
to examine the circumstances surrounding Minarik's guilty 
plea. Two significant sources of testimony highlighted the 
hearing. First, expert witnesses testified about the possible 
effects of mixing alcohol and Triavil, an anti-depressant 
prescription drug that Minarik had been taking at the time 
of the murder. Second, Minarik's trial counsel, Ralph J. 
Cappy, testified that he had thoroughly discussed all of the 
elements of, and defenses to, the first degree murder charge 
with Minarik before he entered his plea. According to 
Cappy, Minarik insisted upon pleading guilty against his 
advice. The District Court denied Minarik's petition and 
this Court affirmed. 
 
On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"). 110 Stat. 1214. AEDPA substantially revised the 
law governing federal habeas corpus codified in chapters 
153 and 154 of Title 28. See 28 U.S.C. SS 2241-66. AEDPA 
contains "gatekeeping" provisions that establish new 
procedural and substantive standards governing "second or 
successive" habeas petitions. Id. S 2244. Procedurally, the 
AEDPA amendments require petitioners to file a motion in 
the appropriate Court of Appeals requesting an order 
authorizing the District Court to consider their"second or 
successive" application. Id. S 2244(b)(3)(A). A three judge 
panel of the Court of Appeals may grant such a motion only 
where the petitioner establishes a prima facie case that the 
application satisfies AEDPA's new substantive standards 
regarding "second or successive" petitions. Id. 
S 2244(b)(3)(C). Notably, the new substantive standards 
governing the allowance of second or successive 
applications are more rigorous than the pre-AEDPA 
standard developed by the courts interpreting the prior 
version of S 2244. See James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure S 28.3a, at 
271 (Supp. 1997)("[AEDPA] sharply narrow[ed] the (already 
extremely narrow) circumstances in which new-claim 
successive petitions are permitted"). 
 
On October 6, 1997, following another unsuccessful bid 
for post conviction relief in state court, Minarikfiled a 
 
                                3 
  
second federal habeas corpus petition, the subject of this 
appeal, stating three grounds for relief. First, Minarik 
claims that his trial counsel's failure to discover the 
availability of an involuntary intoxication defense deprived 
him of effective assistance of counsel. Second, Minarik 
repeats his contention that he did not knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. Third, 
Minarik claims that the state court violated his Fourteenth 
and Sixth Amendment rights when it refused to hold an 
evidentiary hearing regarding his claim that trial counsel 
disregarded his request to file a direct appeal. 
 
Because Minarik had filed a previous habeas petition in 
1981, the District Court transferred Minarik's second 
petition to this Court to permit us to perform our new 
gatekeeping function under 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(A). 
Discerning a possible retroactivity problem, we requested 
that the parties brief the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244's "second or successive" petition provisions, as 
amended by AEDPA, apply in a case where the first petition 
was filed prior to AEDPA's enactment. 
 
II. 
 
Two Supreme Court decisions guide our retroactivity 
analysis in this case. First, we must consider Landgraf v. 
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the landmark case 
which establishes the analytical framework governing 
retroactivity issues. Second, we must consult the Court's 
more recent decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059 
(1997), where it provided additional guidance regarding 
Landgraf retroactivity analysis in a case involving AEDPA. 
 
In Landgraf, the Court considered whether provisions of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that provided expanded rights 
to recover compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII 
suits, and the right to a jury trial in cases involving claims 
for such damages, could be applied to cases pending when 
the Act took effect. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 247. The Court 
found in its case law a strong historical presumption 
against the retroactive application of statutes: 
 
       [T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is 
       deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a 
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       legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. 
       Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that 
       individuals should have an opportunity to know what 
       the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; 
       settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. 
       For that reason, the principle that the legal effect of 
       conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law 
       that existed when the conduct took place has timeless 
       and universal appeal. In a free dynamic society, 
       creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is 
       fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence 
       about the legal consequences of their actions. 
 
Id. at 265-66 (citations omitted). The Court noted that 
several constitutional provisions manifest similar anti- 
retroactivity principles.1 Recognizing the "limited scope" of 
the constitutional restrictions, however, the Court indicated 
that, absent a violation of such a constitutional provision, 
the traditional anti-retroactivity presumption permits 
retroactive application only where "Congressfirst makes its 
intention clear [so as to leave no question] that Congress 
itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity 
outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness." Id. at 
268. The Court then announced a two part test for 
statutory retroactivity problems: 
 
       When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after 
       the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine 
       whether Congress has expressly prescribed the 
       statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Id. at 266. Article I contains two direct prohibitions upon retroactive 
application. First, the Ex Post Facto clauses prohibit retroactive 
application of criminal laws by state and federal governments. Id. (citing 
U.S. Const. art. I, SS 9-10). Second, the Bills of Attainder clauses 
forbid 
"legislatures from singling out persons and meting out summary 
punishment for past conduct." Id. Additionally, the Constitution contains 
a number of indirect limitations upon retroactivity (i) States are limited 
in their ability to enforce laws "impairing the Obligation of Contracts"; 
(ii) the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause preclude s legislatures from 
taking private property except where there is a"public purpose" and 
"just compensation"; and (iii) the Due Proce ss Clauses "protect the 
interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by 
retroactive application." Id. (citations omitted). 
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       course, there is no need to resort to judicial default 
       rules. When, however, the statute contains no such 
       express command, the court must determine whether 
       the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., 
       whether it would impair rights a party possessed when 
       he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct or 
       impose new duties with respect to transactions already 
       completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, 
       our traditional presumption teaches that it does not 
       govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such 
       a result. 
 
Id. at 280. 
 
Finally, the Landgraf Court identified three categories in 
which "application of new statutes passed after the events 
in suit is unquestionably proper" even "absent specific 
legislative authorization." Id. at 273. First, "when the 
intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of 
prospective relief, the application of the new provision is 
not retroactive." Id. at 273. Second, courts may apply 
statutes "conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not 
jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or 
when the suit was filed." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274. Third, 
"[c]hanges in procedural rules may often be applied in suits 
arising before their enactment without raising concerns 
about retroactivity." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275. 
 
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the 
1991 Act's damages provisions could not be applied to 
cases pending at the time of enactment because Congress 
failed to provide an "explicit command" regarding 
retroactivity and applying the new damages provisions 
would have a "genuine retroactive effect" by attaching new 
legal consequences to events completed before the Act's 
enactment. Id. at 280-84.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Court noted that statutory provisions conferring a right to a jury 
trial are procedural and ordinarily are applied to pending cases that have 
not been tried. Since the Act called for jury trials only in those 
situations 
where the plaintiff seeks to enforce the newly created right, however, the 
jury trial option had to "stand or fall with the attached damages 
provisions." Id. at 281. 
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In Lindh, the Court considered whether AEDPA's new 
standards for granting habeas petitions in non-capital 
cases under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) could be applied to cases 
pending at the time AEDPA was enacted. 117 S. Ct. at 
2059. The District Court had denied Lindh's habeas corpus 
application in 1995. Shortly after oral argument in Lindh's 
appeal before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, AEDPA 
became effective substantially modifying federal habeas 
corpus law. After en banc reconsideration, the Court of 
Appeals applied Landgraf and concluded that the AEDPA 
modified version of S 2254(d) could be applied to Lindh's 
case because it did not "attach new legal consequences" to 
events completed before enactment, and therefore did not 
result in a genuine retroactive effect. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that Congress did not intend to apply 
AEDPA's habeas corpus amendments to non-capital cases 
pending when AEDPA became effective. 
 
The Lindh majority began by stating that Landgraf stood 
for the proposition that "where a statute [does] not clearly 
mandate an application with retroactive effect, a court 
[must] determine whether applying it as its terms ostensibly 
indicated would have [sic] genuinely retroactive effect; if so, 
the judicial presumption against retroactivity would bar its 
application." Id. at 2062. The Court rejected, however, the 
respondent's contention that "whenever a new statute on 
its face could apply to the litigation of events that occurred 
before it was enacted, there are only two alternative sources 
of rules to determine its ultimate temporal reach: either an 
`express command' from Congress or application of our 
Landgraf default rule." Id. Instead, the Court stated that: 
 
       [i]n determining whether a statute's terms would 
       produce a retroactive effect . . . and in determining a 
       statute's temporal reach generally, our normal rules of 
       construction apply. Although Landgraf's default rule 
       would deny application when a retroactive effect would 
       otherwise result, other construction rules may apply to 
       remove even the possibility of retroactivity (as by 
       rendering the statutory provision wholly inapplicable to 
       a particular case). 
 
Id. at 2063. 
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The Court further stressed that Landgraf's retroactivity 
analysis must be case-specific: 
 
       In sum, if the application of a [statutory] term would be 
       retroactive as to [the particular party affected], the 
       term will not be applied, even if in the absence of 
       retroactive effect, we might find the term applicable. 
 
Id. 
 
Applying "normal rules of construction" to determine 
congressional intent regarding AEDPA's temporal reach, the 
Court observed that all of AEDPA's habeas corpus 
amendments are found in Title I of the Act, and that Title 
I's amendments can be divided into two categories: 
(i) amendments to chapter 153 of Title 28 governin g all 
federal habeas corpus proceedings found in #8E8E # 101-106 of 
the Act, and (ii) amendments establishing a new ch apter 
154 of Title 28 governing habeas proceedings against 
qualifying states in capital cases found in S 107 of the Act. 
See id. (citing 110 Stat. 1217-26). Notably,S 107(c) provides 
that "[c]hapter 154 . . . shall apply to cases pending on or 
after the date of enactment of this Act." 110 Stat. 1226. 
According to the Court, "the negative implication of S 107(c), 
is that the new provisions of chapter 153 generally apply 
only to cases filed after the Act became effective." Lindh, 
117 S.Ct. at 2068. Thus, the AEDPA modified chapter 153 
standards for granting applications for habeas relief could 
not be applied to Lindh's case because it was "pending" on 
appeal when AEDPA became effective. 
 
We read Landgraf and Lindh as establishing the following 
principles that we must employ in resolving the issues 
before us: 
 
       1. There is a strong presumption against applying a 
       statute in a manner that would attach "new legal 
       consequences" to events completed before the statute's 
       enactment, i.e., a manner that would "impair rights a 
       party possessed when he acted, increase a party's 
       liability for past conduct, or impose new duties." 
       Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
 
       2. If Congress has focused on the issue, "has 
       determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh 
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       the potential for disruption or unfairness," and has 
       provided unambiguous evidence of its conclusion by 
       directing that retroactive effect be given, then, and only 
       then, will the presumption be overridden. 
 
       3. Consistent with these principles, normal rules of 
       statutory construction "may apply to remove . . . the 
       possibility of retroactivity." Nothing short of an 
       unambiguous directive, however, will justify giving a 
       statute a retroactive effect. Thus, when normal rules of 
       statutory construction indicate that a statute is 
       intended to be applied in a manner involving no 
       retroactive effect, a Court need inquire no further. On 
       the other hand, if such construction suggests that a 
       retroactive effect may have been intended, the 
       traditional presumption nevertheless bars retroactive 
       application unless an unambiguous congressional 
       directive is found.3 
 
III. 
 
With these principles in mind we address Minarik's claim 
that applying AEDPA's "second or successive application" 
procedures and standards to his case would result in an 
impermissible retroactive application of the statute. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We recently distilled these principles from Landgraf and Lindh in 
Mathews v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 161 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 1998). In 
Mathews, we employed a three-step analysis that, in the first step, called 
for the Court to determine whether Congress had provided an "express 
command" regarding the statute's temporal reach and, in the third step, 
called for the Court to ascertain whether there was a "clear 
[congressional] intent" to apply the statute retroactively. Id. at 161. 
Because we found neither an "express command" nor a "clear" 
expression of intent, we declined to give the statute retroactive effect. 
Our analysis left open the possibility that giving retroactive effect may 
be 
justified by reference to legislative history and statutory purpose even 
in 
the absence of an unambiguous directive in the statute's text. Compare 
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (requiring 
"an intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" as 
satisfactory evidence that Congress focused on and decided to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity). We have no occasion to resolve that 
issue here. As in Mathews, there is nothing in the AEDPA's purpose or 
its legislative history that is even arguably sufficient to override the 
presumption against retroactive effect. 
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As a threshold matter, we note that the Lindh  decision's 
construction of AEDPA's temporal reach does not control 
the outcome of this case. Lindh held that AEDPA's text, 
read in light of normal principles of statutory 
 905<!>interpretation, evidences a congressional intent that 
 
AEDPA's chapter 153 amendments should generally be 
applied to petitions, like Minarik's, filed after April 24, 
1996, the effective date of the Act, but not to petitions, like 
Lindh's, filed before. This does not resolve the issue before 
us, however. The finding of congressional intent in Lindh 
was based on the drawing of a negative inference from 
Congress's express mandate that AEDPA's new rules 
regarding certain death penalty cases apply to pending 
cases. Because Congress had expressly provided for 
application to pending capital cases, but not to pending 
non-capital cases, it was a fair inference that Congress did 
not intend retrospective application to the latter. Landgraf 
and Lindh make clear, however, that while such an 
inference is sufficient to eliminate the possibility of a 
retroactivity problem, it is not the kind of unambiguous 
statement that will justify overriding the judicial 
presumption against retroactivity in a case where a 
retroactivity problem exists. See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 166- 
68 (rejecting a similar "negative inference" from the 
statute's text as evidence of "clear intent" to justify a 
statute's retroactive effect). 
 
Landgraf describes the statement of congressional intent 
necessary to override the presumption against retroactive 
application in terms of "express commands,""unambiguous 
directives," and "clear statements." 511 U.S. at 263, 264, 
272-73, 286. It specifically teaches that "a statement that 
a statute will become effective on a certain date does not 
even arguably suggest that it has application to conduct 
that occurred at an earlier date." Id. at 257. It necessarily 
follows, we believe, that the negative inference drawn in 
Lindh -- that the Act's chapter 153 amendments are 
applicable to cases filed after its enactment-- does not 
constitute an unambiguous directive that those 
amendments be applied to all post-enactment filed 
petitions, including those in which the first petition was 
filed before the Act's passage. 
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Moreover, Lindh counsels that the only cases in which 
the Court has "found truly `retroactive' effect adequately 
authorized by statute have involved statutory language so 
clear that it could sustain only one interpretation." 117 S. 
Ct. at 2064 n.4. It was precisely because the negative 
inference drawn under normal principles of statutory 
construction did not satisfy this requirement that the Lindh 
Court discussed at some length the distinction between 
express congressional commands and manifestations of 
congressional intent gleaned by applying those principles. 
In short, it is apparent that the Court in Lindh  meticulously 
examined the AEDPA and failed to find any express 
command from Congress regarding retroactive application 
of the AEDPA's chapter 153 amendments. See Liebman & 
Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus S 2.7b, at 29 ("Lindh also 
makes clear that [AEDPA's habeas corpus amendments] 
nowhere state Congress' intention to cause retroactive 
effects . . . "). 
 
Based on our reading of Landgraf and Lindh, we join two 
other courts of appeals in holding that AEDPA contains no 
unambiguous guidance regarding retroactive application of 
AEDPA's new "second or successive" petition standards and 
procedures to cases in which the first habeas petition was 
filed before AEDPA's enactment. See In re Green, 144 F.3d 
384 (6th Cir. 1998); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 924 (6th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 165 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). 
 
Having concluded that Congress did not clearly express 
its intent regarding the retroactivity issue presented in this 
case, we now turn to a case-specific analysis of whether 
applying AEDPA's S 2244(b) would have a genuine 
retroactive effect by "attach[ing] new legal consequences to 
events completed before [AEDPA's] enactment." Landgraf, 
511 U.S. at 270. If applying the AEDPA's habeas corpus 
amendments would produce a genuine retroactive effect in 
Minarik's case, then Landgraf's default rule prohibits their 
application. If on the other hand, no such retroactive effect 
would result, then Lindh requires us to apply the AEDPA 
amendments because Minarik's second petition wasfiled 
after April 24, 1996. To resolve this issue we treat 2244(b)'s 
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new procedural provisions and substantive standards  
separately.4 
 
A. AEDPA's New Procedure 
 
AEDPA established a new procedure governing "second or 
successive" petitions for federal habeas corpus relief under 
S 2244(b). It provides: 
 
       Before a second or successive application permitted by 
       this section is filed in the district court, the applicant 
       shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an 
       order authorizing the district court to consider the 
       application. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(A). Minarik maintains that subjecting 
him to this new procedure is an impermissible retroactive 
application of the statute. Section 2244(b)(3)(A), however, is 
a change in procedural law which falls within thefirmly 
established "procedural change" category described in 
Landgraf that may be retrospectively applied. See Landgraf, 
511 U.S. at 275 ("Because rules of procedure regulate 
secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new 
procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise 
to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial 
retroactive."). 
 
Because AEDPA, as read by the Lindh Court in the light 
of normal principles of statutory interpretation, calls for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We reject appellee's contention that the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998) controls the 
issue of AEDPA's applicability in this case. In Calderon, the Court of 
Appeals had issued a mandate denying the petitioner's pre-AEDPA 
petition for habeas relief. Id. at 1496. Shortly before petitioner's 
scheduled execution, the petitioner filed a post-AEDPA motion to recall 
the mandate, which was granted by the Court of Appeals. Id. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals abused its 
discretion in revoking the mandate. Id. at 1506. In the course of its 
opinion, the Court rejected an argument that the recall of the mandate 
constituted a favorable action on a "second or successive petition" and 
was thus barred by S 2244(b)'s new standared. The Court found only 
that there had been no action on a "successive petition." The issue of 
retroactive effect was not before the Court, and any suggestion that 
S 2244(b) is to be applied retroactively would have been dictum. 
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application of S 2244(b)(3)(A) to cases filed after April 24, 
1996, and because it is a rule of procedure that does not 
"attach new legal consequences to events completed before 
its enactment," petitioners in Minarik's position must seek 
permission of a Court of Appeals prior to proceeding on a 
second petition, even if their first petition wasfiled before 
the Act was adopted. See In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 934 
(6th Cir. 1997) ("Inmates who wish to file a second or 
successive petition should first file a motion in [the Court 
of Appeals] requesting permission under 28 U.S.C.SS 2244, 
2255, regardless of when the first motion to vacate 
sentence was filed."). 
 
B. AEDPA's New Substantive Standards 
 
We now consider whether applying AEDPA's new 
substantive gatekeeping standards would have an 
impermissible retroactive effect if applied in Minarik's case. 
At all times here relevant, the unsuccessful prosecution of 
a S 2254 proceeding has had an adverse impact on the 
petitioner's right to prosecute a second or successive S 2254 
proceeding. When Minarik filed his first federal habeas 
petition, the existing law provided that he could thereafter 
prosecute another such petition only if he could (1)  show 
cause for, and prejudice from, the omission of his new 
claim or claims from his earlier petition (i.e., that his 
proceeding would not constitute an "abuse of the writ"), or 
(2) demonstrate "actual innocence." See  28 U.S.C. S 2244; 
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Kuhlman v. Wilson, 
477 U.S. 436 (1986). 
 
AEDPA's passage significantly altered the showing that 
Minarik was required to make in order to proceed on new 
claims in a second petition. Section 2244(b), as amended by 
AEDPA, provides in relevant part: 
 
       (1) A claim presented in a second or successive 
       habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 
       presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. 
 
       (2) A claim presented in a second or successive 
       habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 
       not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed 
       unless-- 
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       (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a  new 
       rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 
       collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
       previously unavailable; or 
 
       (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could n ot 
       have been discovered previously through the exercise of 
       due diligence; and 
 
       (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and 
       viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 
       sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
       that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 
       factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
       underlying offense. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(2). 
 
These substantive gatekeeping provisions were intended 
to reduce the universe of cases in which a habeas petition 
may go forward on a second or successive petition. In those 
cases where a prisoner in state custody had a right to 
prosecute a second or successive petition prior to AEDPA's 
passage, but would be deprived of that right by these new 
gatekeeping provisions, we conclude that applying the 
AEDPA standard would have a "genuine retroactive effect" 
because it would attach a new and adverse consequence to 
pre-AEDPA conduct -- the prosecution of the original 
proceeding. 
 
By its terms, S 2244(b) requires that a claim not meeting 
its articulated standards "shall be dismissed" thus 
extinguishing any right the petitioner may have to relief. Its 
effect is not unlike that of AEDPA's statute of limitations 
which we recently declined to apply retroactively in Burns 
v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). On September 
21, 1995, when Burns exhausted all of his state rights of 
direct appeal and collateral review, there was no statute of 
limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions under 28 
U.S.C. S 2254. AEDPA, however, established a one year 
statute of limitations which, by its terms, begins to run as 
soon as the petitioner's rights of direct review have been 
exhausted or expired. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d). If 
applicable, AEDPA's limitations period would require Burns 
to file his petition on or before September 22, 1996. Burns, 
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however, filed his petition on April 22, 1997. Because 
Burns had a right to proceed on his habeas claim prior to 
AEDPA's enactment, and because AEDPA's statute of 
limitations, if applied to his case, would extinguish his 
claim, we held that such an application would 
impermissibly attach new legal consequences to events 
completed before the statute's enactment. Burns , 134 F.3d 
at 111. We see no meaningful distinction between that case 
and Minarik's, assuming that Minarik had a right to 
proceed on his claim prior to AEDPA. 
 
AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions when applied to cases in 
which there was a right to proceed under preexisting law 
also operate much like the RICO amendment we considered 
in Mathews, 161 F.3d at 163. Prior to the RICO 
amendment, securities fraud could serve as a predicate 
offense under RICO, thereby entitling a plaintiff to treble 
damages. The RICO amendment altered the text of the 
statute conferring federal jurisdiction over RICO claims to 
exclude jurisdiction over RICO claims predicated on"any 
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the 
purchase or sale of securities." Id. We pointed out that, 
while phrased in jurisdictional terms, the amendment's 
practical effect was to alter substantive rights because 
"prior to the passage of the Act, the [plaintiff] had a RICO 
cause of action based upon defendants' alleged actions, but 
afterward he would not." Id. Similarly, if a habeas petitioner 
had a right to initiate federal proceedings to secure release 
from confinement prior to AEDPA, and had no such rights 
thereafter, then AEDPA has altered substantive rights and 
thereby attached new legal consequences to pre-enactment 
conduct.5 
 
We find additional support for our conclusion in cases 
from two other circuits. See Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161; In re 
Green, 1998 144 F.3d 384; In re Sonshine, 132 F.3d 1133 
(6th Cir. 1997); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922. These Courts 
have encountered a similar retroactivity issue in cases 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Mathews, we distinguished Salazar-Haro v. I.N.S., 95 F.3d 309 (3d 
Cir. 1996), as falling on the other side of the"substantive/jurisdictional 
dichotomy." 161 F.3d at 163. We view this case as falling on the same 
side of that dichotomy as Mathews and Burns. 
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where petitioners challenged application of AEDPA's new 
"gatekeeping" standards governing "second or successive" 
S 2255 motions. In these cases, the petitioners filed their 
first S 2255 motions before, and their second motions after, 
AEDPA's effective date. These Courts have concluded that 
the AEDPA standard would have an impermissible 
retroactive effect if applied where the petitioner would have 
been allowed to file his second S 2255 motion under the 
pre-AEDPA standard, but would be precluded from doing so 
under the AEDPA standard. See Ortiz, 136 F.3d at 166 
("[T]he new standards and procedures under AEDPA for 
filing S 2255 motions could only be improperly retroactive 
as applied to [the petitioner] if he would have met the 
former cause-and-prejudice standard under McCleskey and 
previously would have been allowed to file a second motion, 
but could not file a second motion under AEDPA."); In re 
Hanserd, 123 F.3d at 930 ("When [the movant] filed his 
initial S 2255 motion, the law would have allowed him to 
raise a Bailey claim in a second motion . . . Under AEDPA, 
however, he may not. Applying the new statute would thus 
attach a severe new legal consequence to his filing a first 
motion . . . Because Congress has not expressed an intent 
that the new Act have such a retroactive effect, we could 
not apply AEDPA in this way."); Sonshine, 132 F.3d at 1134 
(noting that retroactive effect exists only where the 
"difference matters" between pre- and post-AEDPA 
standards). Conversely, where the two standards lead to the 
same outcome, these courts have concluded that there is 
no genuine retroactive effect and the AEDPA standard may 
be applied. See Sonshine, 132 F.3d at 1135 ("[Petitioner's 
claim] would be barred under both AEDPA and the old 
abuse-of-writ standard. [Petitioner] would not have 
prevailed under pre-AEDPA law, as his petition would have 
been denied as an abuse of writ. AEDPA's restrictions thus 
do not attach new legal consequences for [petitioner], and 
AEDPA has no impermissible retroactive effect on this 
case."); Ortiz, 136 F.3d at 167 (applying AEDPA's new 
standard to deny the petitioner's second S 2255 motion 
carried no impermissible retroactive effect because 
petitioner "failed to meet the requirements of the former 
`abuse of writ' standard of McCleskey, and the new AEDPA 
standards."); see also In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d at 932 
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("Where the old and the new law lead to an identical result, 
there is no need to conduct a retroactivity analysis because 
the new law has not attached any new consequences to 
preenactment conduct or upset settled expectations."); 
United States v. Enigwe, 1998 WL 150974 (E.D.Pa. March 
30, 1998) (applying AEDPA standards where firstS 2255 
motion was filed before AEDPA was not impermissibly 
retroactive because there was "no difference in outcome 
between pre- and post-AEDPA law"). We agree. 
 
We conclude therefore that if Minarik can show that he 
would have been entitled to pursue his second petition 
under pre-AEDPA law, then the Landgraf default rule 
prohibits applying AEDPA's new substantive gatekeeping 
provisions to bar his claims. In the absence of such a 
showing, however, applying those standards to Minarik 
results in no genuine retroactive effect, and the AEDPA 
standard must be applied under the Supreme Court's 
holding in Lindh that AEDPA's habeas corpus amendments 
apply generally to cases filed after its effective date. 
 
1. The Pre-AEDPA Law And Minarik's Second Petition 
 
We first consider whether Minarik's second application is 
barred under the pre-AEDPA standard. For the reasons 
that follow, we conclude that it is. 
 
Minarik filed his first federal habeas petition on 
December 23, 1981, ten years after pleading guilty to his 
fiancee's murder. His first petition raised two claims: 
(1) the due process clause was violated because hi s guilty 
plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
entered because (a) his counsel did not explain to  him the 
mental state which the State would be required to prove 
and, (b) he had no recollection of the events surr ounding 
the crime, and (2) the equal protection and due pr ocess 
clauses were violated when the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania failed to apply Commonwealth v. Minor, 365 
A.2d 346 (Pa. 1976), in his case. 
 
In November of 1982, the District Court held a lengthy 
evidentiary hearing concerning the circumstances 
surrounding Minarik's guilty plea. Minarik called two expert 
witnesses to testify about the effects of alcohol and Triavil, 
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a drug prescribed for Minarik several months before the 
murder. While neither knew when Minarik last took Triavil 
before the crime or how much alcohol he had consumed, 
each expressed the opinion, inter alia, that he was 
amnesiac following his arrest. Minarik testified that he had 
no memory of the events of the crime, that his attorney had 
failed to advise him regarding the intent that would have to 
be proved and that counsel, rather than Minarik, made the 
decision to plead guilty. The respondent called Minarik's 
trial counsel, Ralph J. Cappy, in rebuttal. He confirmed 
that Minarik's memory on the night of the murder lapsed 
when he was in the bushes outside the house. Counsel also 
testified that he reviewed every element of the offense 
charged and possible defenses with Minarik, and explained 
that Minarik had insisted on pleading guilty against 
counsel's advice. Counsel summed up the situation as 
follows: 
 
       Q. Did you make a recommendation yourself as to 
       whether or not there should be a guilty plea or you 
       should go to trial? 
 
       A. I know that was one point of disagreement that he 
       and I always had. 
 
       I was always -- my recollection is that I wanted to try 
       this case. There were a number of reasons why I 
       wanted to try it. I didn't believe in my heart that a jury 
       would send a 21-year-old man, with his education, lack 
       of prior record, to the electric chair. 
 
       We had somewhat of an equitable defense, in the 
       sense that this was a homicide resulting from a lover's 
       situation, with a very distraught defendant; we had 
       alcohol involved; we had a potential for drugs and 
       alcohol involved; we had a potential, as I recall the 
       Behavior Clinic describing him as having had a 
       personality disorder. None of these things by 
       themselves rose to the level of the legitimate defense, 
       but it was my opinion, taken together with his age, his 
       family, it was a very good family, hard working good 
       people, that our equitable defense, in my mind, would 
       have -- I mean, there's always a chance involved, but 
       in my mind I didn't believe I would lose the case to the 
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       death penalty, therefore the worse I could do was life, 
       therefore, why not take a chance and see if you could 
       get a second or voluntary. Voluntary was probably the 
       most realistic from analyzing it from a legal standpoint. 
 
       Quite frankly, John refused all through this. If my 
       memory serves me correctly, he never wanted to go to 
       trial. He steadfastly maintained that he was pleading 
       guilty, period; he was going to take his punishment. 
 
App. III at 526-527a. 
 
Counsel further testified that he had talked with 
Minarik's family doctor who had prescribed Triavil for the 
depression Minarik experienced after the breakup with his 
fiancee. He engaged the services of Dr. Stanger, a 
psychiatrist, to secure an opinion regarding a possible 
insanity defense, and he reviewed reports supplied by the 
state from the Behavioral Clinic on Minarik's mental state. 
In connection with the possibility of an intoxication 
defense, counsel and the Chief Investigator of the Public 
Defender's Office interviewed everyone they couldfind who 
was present at the party Minarik attended earlier on the 
evening of the crime. They discovered two witnesses who 
were prepared to testify that Minarik "had announced his 
intended purpose prior to actually going to commit this 
act." Id. at 535a. 
 
When asked whether he had investigated and considered 
"an intoxication defense" and an "involuntary intoxication 
defense," counsel gave the following testimony: 
 
       A. My investigation, as I recall it, did reveal th e fact 
       that at some time during the evening, earlier in the 
       evening, John had become intoxicated and had placed 
       himself on a couch and dozed off, or rested for a period 
       of time. Subsequent to that time he either awoke or got 
       up and seemed to be, to the witnesses who had talked 
       with him, coherent, not intoxicated, and to one of those 
       witnesses he had offered a ring, an engagement ring, 
       that apparently had been the victim's ring, as I recall, 
       and had told the witness, "I'll not need this ring after 
       tonight," or "I'll no longer need this ring," and told this 
       witness that he was going to, in essence, kill Rosemary. 
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       Q. Did you investigate the possibility of defendin g 
       against these charges on an involuntary intoxication 
       theory? 
 
       A. John had told me that he was taking a medicatio n 
       -- I had a discussion or discussions with the family 
       doctor -- 
 
* * * 
 
       The family physician had prescribed for him a 
       particular drug. I know that's an issue in this case, but 
       I'm still not familiar with exactly all the ramifications. 
       I thought maybe we would have a chance to produce a 
       defense that would reduce the degree by combining the 
       alcohol with the drug and I endeavored to do that. I 
       know I inquired of not only Dr. Stanger, but I even 
       went down to Dr. Campbell, but I'm not quite sure it 
       was Dr. Campbell, about what would be the effect of 
       the drug with alcohol and I believe at the time it was 
       grain alcohol, I'm not sure about that, but anyway it 
       was some kind of a college party, could there be a 
       reason, in combining these two drugs, I mean the drug 
       and the alcohol, could that have set John off, or could 
       we connect that with a mental deficiency which would 
       result in a defense? Maybe not a complete blackout 
       defense, but some defense which would reduce the 
       degree from first to second, or even go into voluntary 
       manslaughter. I remember specifically Dr. Stanger 
       saying, "No, I believe . . ." -- the problem I'm having 
       here is, I consulted with a number of people on this, 
       not only other criminal defense attorneys, but 
       physicians, some of them psychiatrists, these were 
       friends of mine who were in a residency program, an 
       internship program at the University of Pittsburgh, and 
       I could get from no one any indication that an 
       accommodation of this drug and alcohol, given the facts 
       as described by the witnesses at the party, before he 
       left on his way to Rosemary, no physician or physician 
       in training could give me any indication that the 
       alcohol and drug played a part in what he had done. 
 
Id. at 535a-536a; 537a-538a. 
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The District Court credited trial counsel's testimony and 
concluded that Minarik's plea was knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entered. While it found that Minarik lacked 
memory of the events surrounding the crime at the time of 
his plea, the Court concluded that this did not prevent the 
plea from being knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Finally, 
it rejected the contention that the failure of the 
Pennsylvania court to follow the Minor case constituted a 
federal constitutional violation. On appeal, this Court 
affirmed in all respects. 
 
Following an unsuccessful bid for post-conviction relief in 
state court, Minarik filed his second federal habeas petition 
on October 3, 1997. He asserted three claims: (1)  trial 
counsel's failure to discover that he had available a 
complete defense of involuntary intoxication induced by 
Triavil and alcohol constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel, (2) due process was violated because his guilty 
plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and (3) the 
state court's failure to give him an evidentiary hearing on 
his claim that trial counsel failed to file a direct appeal as 
he instructed violated due process. To support his second 
claim, Minarik renews his first petition's allegations of 
amnesia and lack of knowledge of the elements of the 
offense and adds several new allegations. In the course of 
making these three claims, Minarik asserts that he is 
actually innocent because he was involuntarily intoxicated 
at the time of the crime. 
 
Minarik's second claim is, in substance, the same claim 
advanced and rejected in his first habeas proceeding.6 
Accordingly, he can go forward on that claim only if he 
shows "actual innocence." Kuhlman, 477 U.S. 436. Before 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Minarik's second petition alleges two new factual predicates for his 
claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary: 
(i) trial counsel failed to advise him that a jury  verdict would have to 
be 
unanimous, and (ii) the trial judge had improperly  participated in plea 
negotiations. His brief in support of his request for an order authorizing 
the District Court to entertain his second petition continues to be 
premised primarily on his alleged amnesia and lack of knowledge of the 
elements of the offense. Minarik offers no argument to excuse the 
omission of these claims from his first petition under the cause and 
prejudice standard. 
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addressing that issue, we turn to whether Minarik has 
shown "cause and prejudice" for failing to include his first 
and third claims in his first petition. 
 
"The cause standard requires the petitioner to show that 
`some objective factor external to the defense impeded 
counsel's efforts to raise the claim in state court." 
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (quoting Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488). While a showing that the factual 
basis for a claim was unavailable at the time of thefirst 
petition may constitute "cause," the fact that the petitioner 
was subjectively unaware of that factual basis is 
insufficient if the relevant facts were discoverable with due 
diligence. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 497. 
 
We begin with Minarik's first claim: ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failing to discover the involuntary intoxication 
defense. While Minarik insists that he did not know that he 
had a defense of involuntary intoxication until the middle of 
the evidentiary hearing on his first petition, his habeas 
counsel had obviously discovered the potential effects of 
Triavil and alcohol some weeks earlier and no reason is 
suggested why a similar investigation at any point during 
the ten years preceding the first petition's filing would not 
have produced the same information. It follows that the 
factual basis for Minarik's first claim was discoverable in 
December of 1981, when the first petition wasfiled. Indeed, 
we do not understand Minarik to contend otherwise. 
 
The "cause" that Minarik does rely upon before us is the 
fact that he had not exhausted his state remedies with 
respect to his first claim when he filed hisfirst petition. 
This "cause" is legally insufficient, however, because it is 
not an "objective factor external to the defense." As we have 
explained, Minarik is deemed to have knowledge of all facts 
discoverable with reasonable diligence. With that 
knowledge, he had the alternative on December 23, 1981, 
of delaying the filing of his first federal habeas petition until 
he had exhausted what turned out to be the first claim of 
his second petition. We hold that his failure to do that and 
then litigate all his claims together constituted an abuse of 
the writ. 
 
In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the Supreme 
Court held that a habeas petition containing exhausted and 
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unexhausted claims cannot be entertained by a federal 
court unless the petitioner withdraws, and thus 
relinquishes, the unexhausted claims. This "total 
 
exhaustion" rule, the Court concluded, would"encourage 
state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, 
thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all 
claims of error. . . . Equally as important, [under that rule] 
federal claims that have been fully exhausted in state 
courts will more often be accompanied by a complete 
factual record to aid the federal courts in their review." 455 
U.S. at 519. Finally, the Court emphasized that"strict 
enforcement of the exhaustion requirement will encourage 
habeas petitioners to exhaust all of their claims in state 
court and to present the federal court with a single habeas 
petition. To the extent that the exhaustion requirement 
reduces piecemeal litigation, both the courts and the 
prisoners should benefit, for as a result the district court 
will be more likely to review all of the prisoner's claims in 
a single proceeding, thus providing for a more focused and 
thorough review." 455 U.S. at 520. 
 
The court went on to spell out what this meant for 
petitioning prisoners: 
 
       [O]ur interpretation of SS 2254(b), (c) provides a simple 
       and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you 
       bring any claims to federal court, be sure that thefirst 
       have taken each one to state court.. . .Those prisoners 
       who misunderstand this requirement and submit 
       mixed petitions nevertheless are entitled to resubmit a 
       petition with only exhausted claims or to exhaust the 
       remainder of their claims. 
 
* * * 
 
       The prisoner's principal interest, of course, is in 
       obtaining speedy federal relief on his claims. . . . A total 
       exhaustion rule will not impair that interest since he 
       can always amend the petition to delete the 
       unexhausted claims, rather than returning to state 
       court to exhaust all of his claims. By invoking this 
       procedure, however, the prisoner would risk forfeiting 
       consideration of his unexhausted claims in federal 
       court. . . . 
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455 U.S. at 520. 
 
While the Supreme Court said that petitioners "would 
risk" forfeiture of unexhausted claims rather than that they 
"would forfeit" such claims, this choice of wording was 
designed to leave room for cases in which there might be a 
legitimate justification for proceeding on the exhausted 
issues alone and thus no abuse of the writ. The Court's 
opinion makes it clear, however, that the prisoner's desire 
to get an adjudication of some of his claims earlier rather 
than later is not alone a legitimate justification for going 
forward on less than all of one's claims. Thus, if"a prisoner 
deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal 
collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, in 
the hope of being granted two hearings or for some other 
such reason, he may be deemed to have waived his right to 
a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld 
grounds." Id. at 521 (quoting from Sanders v. United States, 
373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963). 
 
Rose did not announce a new rule of law. It neither 
questioned nor reversed existing precedent. The Court's 
holding reflected its "interpretation of a federal statute on 
the basis of its language and legislative history, and 
consistent with its underlying policies." Rose, 455 U.S. at 
519-20. Rose was argued on October 14, 1981, two months 
before Minarik filed his first federal habeas petition on 
December 23, 1981, and was decided on March 3, 1982, a 
little over two months after that filing date. The statute, its 
legislative history, and its underlying policies were the same 
on those dates as they were when Minarik's first federal 
petition was filed. It necessarily follows that the teachings 
of Rose were the law of the land at the time Minarik elected 
to file a federal habeas petition limited to the two claims 
contained in that petition. 
 
Even if we were unpersuaded that Rose represented the 
law of the land when Minarik filed his petition, however, 
our ultimate conclusion would not differ. Rose  
undisputably became the law of the land on March 3, 1982, 
and the Federal Magistrate Judge's opinion dated April 23, 
1982, expressly called the Rose holding to Minarik and his 
counsel's attention. That opinion preceded the District 
Court's evidentiary hearing concerning the circumstances 
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surrounding Minarik's guilty plea by more than six months. 
The subject matter of that requested hearing included what 
he knew and had been told about the elements of the 
offense charged and the possible defenses thereto. At some 
point well before that hearing, Minarik necessarily must 
have known that he was going to call the two expert 
witnesses he ultimately called to testify about the effects of 
Triavil and alcohol. He likewise was aware that he would 
take the stand and testify that his trial counsel did not 
explain to him the state of mind required as an element of 
the offense. Finally, Minarik obviously knew his trial 
counsel was likely to be called to testify concerning his 
preparation and pre-plea discussions with Minarik. For that 
reason, Minarik took trial counsel's deposition in August of 
1982. 
 
In view of the actual knowledge Minarik possessed well 
before the evidentiary hearing on his first petition, we 
conclude that Minarik had a duty to advise the Court of his 
new claims before the hearing. These claims would 
obviously have required a second, extensive evidentiary 
hearing on essentially the same subject matter. Stated 
conversely, we hold that it was an abuse of the writ for 
Minarik to go forward without at least advising the Court of 
this withheld claim. If he had done so, the District Court 
would have been compelled by Rose to dismiss the petition 
without prejudice and require Minarik to file a new petition 
after exhausting his state remedies on the new claim. 
Indeed, this almost came to pass during the November 
1982 hearing when Minarik's habeas counsel began to 
question Minarik's trial counsel about his investigation of a 
possible defense based on intoxication. The Court raised 
the issue sua sponte: 
 
       THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for one second. 
       I'm becoming somewhat concerned. It appears to me 
       that the issue here is the voluntary nature of the guilty 
       plea. I suspect we are going further afield and raising 
       other issues, and if we are raising other issues, then 
       the entire case is subject to immediate dismissal. 
 
       So, I want to caution you that I think it's very 
       inappropriate to be raising other issues. I think that we 
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       have been getting into them and I think we have been 
       getting into them for quite a while now. 
 
       MR. POTTER: The issues are as stated in the habeas 
       corpus petition and I submit that the cross 
       examination is within the scope of the direct 
       examination. 
 
       THE COURT: Well, I'm not saying one way or the 
       other, but I'm just saying that I think we are at this 
       juncture, clearly injecting issues, which if they are 
       raised in the habeas corpus petition, that the entire 
       petition is subject to dismissal because they have not 
       been raised in the State Court. 
 
* * * 
 
       THE COURT: . . . I have not in my own mind resolve d 
       the issue, but clearly the only issue appropriate before 
       this court is as to the nature of the guilty plea and any 
       other matters, which might be waived in a collateral 
       proceeding, I strongly suggest have to be raised in the 
       State court first and they have not been raised. 
 
       MR. POTTER: I understand the Court's position. 
 
       Q. All right, Mr. Cappy, I will limit myself. We a re 
       interested in amnesia. The defendant had it, didn't he? 
       . . . 
 
App. III at 567a-568a; 568a-569a. 
 
Minarik apparently chose not to call his new claim to the 
District Court's attention because he wanted a ruling on his 
first petition's claims sooner rather than later. While 
understandable, this motivation does not justify the kind of 
piecemeal litigation that Minarik seeks to pursue. 
 
A similar analysis leads us to conclude that asserting 
Minarik's third claim at this late date also constitutes an 
abuse of the writ. On December 23, 1981, Minarik knew 
the content of the instructions he gave trial counsel as well 
as the fact that counsel filed no direct appeal. With this 
knowledge, he was not licensed to withhold this ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim for later litigation. 
 
"Because [Minarik] has been unable to show`cause and 
prejudice' sufficient to excuse his failure to present his 
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evidence in support of his first federal petition,. . . [he] may 
obtain review of his constitutional claims only if he falls 
within the `narrow class of cases . . . implicating a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice.' " Schlup v. Delo, 513 
U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 
U.S. 467 (1991)). This "requires the habeas petitioner to 
show that `a constitutional violation has probably resulted 
in the conviction of one who is actually innocent'. . . . To 
establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show 
that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 
would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. The 
petitioner thus is required to make a stronger showing than 
that needed to establish prejudice." Id. at 327 (quoting from 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986)). 
 
Minarik argues that he is actually innocent because he 
was involuntarily intoxicated when he committed the crime. 
Our task is therefore to look to all of the information 
currently available concerning a potential "defense of 
involuntary intoxication," including that developed in the 
proceedings since Minarik's sentencing, to determine 
whether, more likely than not, no reasonable juror exposed 
to that information would have convicted him. 
 
It is not clear to us that Pennsylvania law would 
characterize intoxication produced by the voluntary 
consumption of a prescription drug and alcohol as 
"involuntary" even if that consumption was without 
knowledge of a synergistic effect. See Commonwealth v. 
Todaro, 446 A.2d 1305 (Pa. Super. 1982) (holding such 
intoxication to be voluntary). Nothing in our analysis turns 
on this point, however. We assume for present purposes 
that evidence of involuntary intoxication of a degree that 
would have deprived Minarik of the ability to form the 
requisite intent, or control his actions, would constitute a 
complete defense or reduce what would otherwise befirst 
degree murder to some lesser included offense.7 We further 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. There is no statutory provision in Pennsylvania on involuntary 
intoxication, and we have found no Pennsylvania case specifying the 
circumstances under which involuntary intoxication constitutes a 
defense. Section 2.08 of the ALI Model Penal Code provides in relevant 
part: 
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assume that "actual innocence" of the crime charged would 
include the situation where the new evidence would show 
the petitioner not guilty of first degree murder, though 
guilty of some lesser offense. Even under these 
assumptions, however, Minarik cannot show "actual 
innocence" because he has failed to establish the necessary 
factual basis. 
 
In addition to the conclusory statement that he"had 
available a complete defense of involuntary intoxication," 
Minarik's petition asserts only that he is "innocent of 
crimes charged because he suffered an involuntary 
intoxication due to misprescribed Triavil which Public 
Defender Cappy missed in 1971." App. IV at 855a-856a. 
Minarik's objections to the Magistrate Judge's report in the 
District Court adds only that "[i]n 1971, Petitioner suffered 
an involuntary intoxication due to `atropenic intoxication' 
because of `inappropriately prescribed' Triavil by Dr. 
Provan." Obj. Mag. Rep. at 9. Minarik's main brief before us 
adds only that he discovered his complete defense"only 
while sitting in court during the federal evidentiary hearing 
in 1982 and listening to the testimony of Drs. Sadoff and 
Himmelhoch." Pet. Br. at 6 n.1. The most specific 
information Minarik has provided is that contained in the 
following segment of his reply brief: 
 
       Triavil contains Elavil, a tricyclic antidepressant, and 
       Trilafon, a member of the phenothiazine family, an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this S ection, 
       intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an 
       element of the offense. 
 
* * * 
 
       (4) Intoxication that (a) is not self-induced or (b) is 
pathological is 
       an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor 
at 
       the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to 
       appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct 
       to the requirements of law. 
 
Model Penal Code S 2.08(1) and (4). In this context, "pathological 
intoxication" means "intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the 
amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is 
susceptible." Id. S 2.08(5)(c). 
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       antipsychotic agent. After his visit to Dr. Provan, while 
       taking Triavil, John Minarik's behavior became 
       increasingly bizarre. 
 
       Mr. Minarik spent Saturday afternoon, February 6, 
       1971, in the company of college friends who were 
       planning a party. His friends, while at the party that 
       night, noticed his visible personality change, his red 
       face, and his dry mouth. Redness of face and dryness 
       of mouth are two observable undesired side effects 
       when a person is suffering from atropinic intoxication: 
       the "class is atropine syndrome" associated with the 
       misprescription of Triavil. Dr. Himmelhoch testified on 
       November 18, 1982: "In medical school this syndrome 
       is summarized as mad as a hatter, red as a beet, and 
       dry as a bone." Neither Dr. Provan nor the prescription 
       label identified the drug, and no warnings were given of 
       side effects or danger associated with alcohol. 
 
Pet. Rep. Br. at. 3-4. 
 
The record before us contains no evidence concerning 
when before the crime Minarik last consumed alcohol or 
Triavil, nor how much he consumed of each. Nor is there 
any evidence that Minarik was observed to have been 
behaving in an aberrant manner after waking from his nap, 
or after the crime. Absent as well is any expert testimony 
supporting the theory that Minarik was out of control at the 
time of the crime. We thus have only general claims of 
involuntary intoxication against the background of sworn 
testimony from an experienced trial attorney that he and 
his investigator conducted an extensive investigation and 
found no evidentiary support for an intoxication defense, 
voluntary or involuntary. 
 
It follows that Minarik has not come close to putting the 
integrity of the judgment against him into question. We 
cannot excuse his abuse of the writ on the ground that he 
has demonstrated actual innocence. Accordingly, we 
conclude that Minarik would have been precluded from 
filing his second habeas petition under pre-AEDPA law. It 
necessarily follows that applying the AEDPA gatekeeping 
standard cannot have a genuine retroactive effect upon 
Minarik and therefore Lindh requires their application. We 
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now turn to determine whether Minarik may proceed on his 
second petition's claims under the new AEDPA standard.8 
 
2. The AEDPA Standard 
 
Minarik's second claim, that his guilty plea was not 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into, is 
repetitive and must be dismissed under S 2244(b)(1) 
because it was "presented in a prior application." Minarik's 
first and third claims, however, are "new claims" that we 
must evaluate under S 2244(b)(2). 
 
Section 2244(b)(2) provides two narrow grounds upon 
which a new claim may be pursued in a second petition, 
neither of which are present here. First, a petitioner may 
make a prima facie showing that his new claim falls within 
the ambit of a "new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court." Id. S 2244(b)(2)(A). Neither of Minarik's "new claims" 
rely upon such a new rule of constitutional law. 
 
Second, S 2244(b)(2)(B) permits petitioners to proceed on 
new claims in certain cases where there is newly discovered 
evidence. It has two requirements. Initially, petitioners 
must demonstrate that the "factual predicate for the claim 
could not have been discovered previously through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence." Id.S 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). 
Additionally, petitioners must establish that "the facts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. If Minarik were correct in his contention that application of 
S 2244(b)(3)(C) to his case would have an impermissible effect, the most 
to which he would be entitled would be application of the pre-existing 
law. Thus, if Minarik conceded that he was barred under AEDPA and his 
impermissible retroactivity argument were the only arrow to his bow, our 
determination that he is barred by pre-existing law would alone justify 
denial of permission to proceed with his second petition. We understand 
Minarik to make a two-pronged argument, however: that he does satisfy 
AEDPA standards and, in the alternative, that if he does not we are 
barred from applying those standards. One approach to resolving these 
contentions would be to address the issue of compliance with AEDPA at 
the outset. We have focused first on the retroactivity issue, however, 
because it is one of first impression in this circuit and because the 
Landgraf /Lindh analysis of that issue leads ultimately back to the 
AEDPA compliance issue. 
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underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the 
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional 
error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the 
applicant guilty of the underlying offense." Id. 
S 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 
Minarik's first "new claim" -- that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to discover that Minarik had a 
complete involuntary intoxication defense -- does not 
satisfy either of S 2244(b)(2)(B)'s conditions. As we 
concluded in our analysis of the pre-AEDPA law, this claim 
was "discoverable" when Minarik filed hisfirst habeas 
application in 1981. In addition, Minarik cannot meet S 
2244(b)(2)(b)(ii)'s innocence requirement for the 
substantially the same reasons that he cannot establish 
"actual innocence" under the pre-AEDPA standard. 
 
Minarik's second "new claim" -- that the state court 
committed constitutional error by failing to give him an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel ignored 
his instruction to file a direct appeal -- also fails to meet 
S2244(b)(2)(B)'s requirements. Minarik had actual 
knowledge of both his instructions and his attorney's 
failure to file such an appeal well before hefiled his first 
habeas petition in 1981. Moreover, his counsel's failure to 
appeal is not a "fact" relevant to whether Minarik was 
"guilty of the underlying offense." 
 
Section 2244(b)(2)(B) thus requires that we deny Minarik 
permission to proceed on his second petition. 
 
IV. 
 
We hold that anyone seeking to file a second or 
successive petition under 18 U.S.C. S 2254 after April 24, 
1996, must move in the appropriate Court of Appeals for an 
order authorizing the District Court to consider the 
application. When such a motion is filed by a petitioner 
whose previous petition was filed before that date, the 
Court of Appeals must apply the substantive gatekeeping 
standards of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b) as amended by AEDPA 
unless such application would bar a second or successive 
petition that could have been considered by the District 
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Court under the law existing at the time the previous 
petition was filed. 
 
Since Minarik's second petition is barred by both 
S 2244(b) as amended by AEDPA and the preexisting law, 
we will deny him permission to proceed in the District 
Court. 
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